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In this video, we'll continue the analysis of the Baraita, the extra-mishnaic
statement attributed to Tannaim that we examined in the last video.
To briefly review, the Baraita said,
it would list four instances in which the laws about edim zomemim do not completely
conform to the biblical requirement to do to him as he schemed to do to his fellow.
The anonymous voice of the Baraita then produced four such cases and
an additional case was appended attributed to Rabbi Akiva.
The first two cases were listed in the Mishnah.
Edim zomemim who accused someone of being an invalid priest and
edim zomemim who accused someone of being unintentional murderer.
According to the Mishnah, these edim zomemim received lashes.
The third case on the list was that of edim zomemim who accused someone of
owning a killer axe.
In this scenario, although the accused party would have had to pay a fine,
the edim zomemim do not.
Finally, the fourth case was that of edim zomemim who accused someone of theft.
If a thief does not have enough money to restore what he stole,
he must be sold as a Hebrew slave and the money used for restitution.
The Baraita, however, says that edim zomemims are not sold as a Hebrew slave.
How exactly does that fourth statement work?
Does that apply when the intended victim does not have enough money?
When the edim zomemim do not have enough money?
Or all of the above?
Let's see how the Talmud analyzes the last piece of the Baraita.
They are not sold, as a Hebrew slave.
Rava Hamnuna thought to say that this statement refers to a case where he,
the victim has money and the edim zomemim do not.
Since, he the victim is not sold, they also are not sold.
But in the case where he the victim does not have money even if the edim zomemim
did have money, they are nonetheless sold.
The Talmud initially provides one formulation of how Hamnuna's
interpretation of the statements.
Rava Hamnuna thought to say that the statement refers to a case in which
the intended victim of the edim zomemim would have had enough money to
make restitution, but the edim zomemim themselves do not.
Since the victim would not be sold into slavery, they,
the edim zomemim also are not sold into slavery even though they cannot pay.
But according to Rava Hamnuna in a case where the intended victim would not
have had enough money even if the edim zomemim did have enough money,
they are nonetheless sold into slavery as part of their punishment.
So according to this initial version of Rava Hamnuna statement, the edim zomemim
are sold into slavery if and only if their victim would've gotten sold into slavery.
If the victim would not have been sold into slavery,
neither are the edim zomemim,
regardless of whether they have enough money to cover the amount of the theft.
However, if the victim would've been sold into slavery, the rules stated in
the right does not apply and the edim zomemim are likewise sold.
Now that we understand this interpretation of Rava Hamnuna,
a mid-third century rabbi, we may be disappointed to discover that the Talmud's
very next line rejects this interpretation as impossible.
Rava said to him, then they, meaning, the edim zomemim should say to him.
Meaning, the victim.
If you had money, would you have been sold?
We also should not be sold.
Rava, a prominent early fourth century rabbi rejects Rava Hamnuna's
interpretation based on the idea that the edim zomemim could protest.
That their punishment should be based on what would have transpired,
if the edim zomemim themselves had been in the victim situation and
not what would have happened to the actual victim.
If the edim zomemim had actually been found guilty of theft,
they would have paid and not been sold into slavery.
Therefore, they would argue, they should not be sold into slavery for
being edim zomemim either.
The Talmud then offers a second version Rav Hamnuna's statement that bypasses
potential problems, rather Rava Hamnuna thought to say that this statement refers
to a case where either he the victim or they, the edim zomemim have money.
But in a case where neither he, nor they have money, they would be sold.
According to the second version of Rava Hamnuna,
the edim zomemim not sold into slavery if either they or
their intended victim have enough money to cover the price of a stolen item.
However, if both the victim and the edim zomemim lack sufficient funds,
the edim zomemim who are unable to protest that if they were in the victim's
place things would be different would indeed be sold into slavery.
This version is also rejected by Rava who offers a midrash on the core verse that
establishes that thieves unable to make restitution get sold into slavery.
The Torah says, he shall be sold for his theft.
For his theft, but not for his hazamah.
Rava highlights the word theft in this verse and reads it as limiting the case of
being sold into slavery to theft only, but not to punishments for hazamah.
Thus, at least according to Rava, the final position seems to be that there is
no case in which the edim zomemim are sold into slavery as a punishment.
What does it mean that the Talmud offers two different versions of Rav Hamnuna's
statement?
Did Rav Hamnuna really come up with two different formulations of his
interpretation of the Baraita?
Or was the report of his statement not entirely certain of what Rav Hamnuna had
originally said?
The question of the reliability of attribution in the Talmud has
been a crucial point of scholarly debate for many years.
On one end of the spectrum, certain scholars think that barring
strong evidence to the contrary statements in the Talmud should be presumed to be
an accurate report of historical conversations.
Proponents of such a view could justify their position based on explicit
statements in the Talmud expressing the utmost importance of giving
proper attribution to a teaching.
At the other end of the spectrum is Jacob Neusner,
a prominent American scholar who made waves in the nineteen eighties when he
asserted that all attributions should be assumed to be historically unreliable.
And merely, a creation of the final editors of the Talmud.
There are some good reasons for doubting the accuracy of attributions.
For example, the Talmud will attribute statements to rabbis,
whose names are clearly just puns on the subject matter.
Passages in the Talmud frequently express doubt,
as to the true author of the statement.
Often, phrased as rabbi X said the following or some say it was rabbi Y.
Finally, some conversations seem to be constructed for polemical or
didactic purposes.
The scholarly consensus today prefers to take a middle road on this question
claiming that it is possible to make broader historical claims about the rabbis
in general.
For example, shifts in conceptualization across generations of rabbis.
However, it is not possible to take every single statement in the Talmud as
historically accurate unless proven, otherwise.
If this is the case, that the Talmud cannot be used as a completely reliable
source of historical information about rabbinic statements,
then it seems that when the Talmud uses the word said,
it's not using that word the way you or I might use it.
For example, Louie Jacobs suggested that said can be understood to mean that
a statement had been attributed to that rabbi by later rabbis, but
that there was no way to know if he had really said the dictum or not.
Another scholar named Sasha Stern thinks that said frequently means something
closer to thought or held expressing an idea that rabbi was thought to have had,
but not necessarily in those words.
As Stern points out,
these alternative understandings of said point to a conception of authorship
in the Talmud that is very different from our modern western notion.
Instead of solely focusing on one individual or author,
the Talmud's attitude toward authorship is more complicated.
Seeing the process of creating and
transmitting legal statements as accomplished in part by individuals and
in part, as a joint enterprise by the entire rabbinic collective.
The two versions of Rava Hamnuna's statement can be viewed as an example of
the Talmud's complicated notion of authorship.
In this passage, the initial report of Rava Hamnuna's statement appears to be
modified based on a rejection so strong as to suggest that Rava Hamnuna could
not possibly have thought such a thing.
The Talmud then offers an apparently more plausible interpretation that
Rava Hamnuna might have offered.
Thus, the content of Rava Hamnuna's claim emerges as
jointly produced by Rava Hamnuna himself, Rava's objection and
the logical process of the passages adhered.
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