Terrorism has arguably been one of the defining factors of our age. It frequently makes headlines, threatening or attacking governments, private business and ordinary citizens. And in many parts of the world, it has been one of the most important threats to peace, security and stability. But what does this exactly mean? What is the nature of this threat? Who or what is threatened, how, by whom and why? What can be done about it or how can we at least limit the impact of terrorism and make sure that terrorists do not make headlines and manage to scare us? These are just a handful of questions that will be addressed in this course that consists of three parts. First it focuses on the essence of terrorism as an instrument to achieve certain goals, in addition to an exploration of this phenomenon and the difficulties in defining it. The second part provides an overview of the state of the art in (counter) terrorism studies. Since ‘9/11’ terrorism studies have grown exponentially, reflecting the rise in perceived threats. But what has academia come up with? What theories, assumptions and conventional wisdom has it produced that could be of help in understanding terrorism and dealing with it? The most interesting results are examined and compared with empirical evidence with the aim to either stress their importance or to debunk them as myths. The final part looks into the implications and possibilities for policy making. The course ends with a module specifically designed to address one of today's most topical issue: the foreign fighter phenomenon.
4.4 Assumption: Terrorism cannot be defeated
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Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Comparing Theory and Practice
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5 Assumptions on Counterterrorism
In this module, we will continue the work of module 3 and look into five assumptions on counterterrorism. It is highly relevant to keep investigating assumptions that underlie CT-policy, both from an effectiveness perspective (is it really countering terrorism?) but also because these policies often have a large impact on societies and might also have unintended consequences.
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Edwin BakkerProf. dr.
Institute of Security and Global Affairs, Leiden University
Jeanine de Roy van Zuijdewijndrs.
Institute of Security and Global Affairs, Leiden University
[MUSIC]
In the last video we discussed whether or not decapitation of terrorist
organizations is a successful counter-terrorism measure.
In this video we will explore the assumption that,
terrorism cannot be defeated.
It is related to the assumption we discussed last week,
about the success of terrorism.
But, in this case,
we look at the effectiveness of counter-terrorism measures.
And defeated, we have defined in a classical way as,
having been beaten in a battle or other contest.
This means that some other party has to be actively and intentionally involved.
And in this case we're talking about defeat by counter-terrorism measures or
counter-terrorism actors.
But who or what is exactly defeated?
Are we talking about the phenomenon of terrorism, or
about individual terrorist groups?
Well, actually, we will look at both.
First, we will focus on the possibility of defeating terrorist groups.
And after that we'll come back, and see whether or
not the phenomenon of terrorism, as a whole, can be defeated.
Who has said, terrorism cannot be defeated?
Well actually quite a few experts and important politicians and public figures.
For instance, General Sir David Richards,
Chief of the Defence staff of the British Armed Forces.
In 2010, regarding defeating Al Qaeda and
Islamist militancy, he said, first of all you have to ask,
do we need to defeat it, in the sense of a clear cut victory?
And I would argue that it is unnecessary and would never be achieved.
Well, that last part is, of course, not very hopeful,
especially not when stated by a top general.
And then former US President George Bush,
in 2004 he was asked, can we win the War on Terror?
And he replied, I don't think you can win it.
But, I think you can create conditions so
that those who use terror as a tool are less acceptable in parts of the world.
So, there's no winning of the War on Terror,
even said by US President George W Bush,
who was, in many ways, the architect of that whole concept.
And then King Abdullah II of Jordan, also in 2010 he said,
we're never going to be able to get rid of terrorism,
because there is always going to be evil in the world.
Well, is he right, is he wrong?
That's what we are going to find out in this video.
Why is it important to investigate this idea, this assumption?
Well, if you believe that terrorism can not be defeated, this could lead to
defeatism and strengthen the idea that terrorism poses a big threat,
of which we can do very little.
That scares us, and that's what terrorists want.
And then in terms of CT measures, if terrorism indeed
cannot be defeated, this implies that we should primarily focus on prevention.
Make sure terrorist groups don't emerge, or
especially focus on managing the impact of terrorism.
If it's there you cannot stop it so, make sure that if it hits us,
the impact is as little as possible.
And measures that aim to stop terrorist or
terrorist organisation are not very useful if this assumption is really true.
How can we measure defeat?
To determine whether or
not a terrorist organization has been defeated, in a battle or a contest,
we have to determine whether or not this was caused by counter-terrorism measures.
For instance by disruption, decapitation, or
by mobilizing communities that said, no, to this particular group or network.
And if that terrorist organisation has ceased to exist because of other reasons,
we cannot say it's been defeated.
And we know that individual terrorist groups, and
even waves of terrorism, can fade out because of many other reasons.
Well, one scholar who has observed this is David Rapoport, and
he distinguished, we discussed that earlier, four waves of terrorism.
And he concluded that these waves, after a few decades, gradually peter out.
But he also gives an example of a defeated type of terrorism.
He said that revolutionary terrorists were defeated in one country after another.
So a very famous scholar, actually referring to defeat,
not only of one group, but of a whole type of terrorism.
And he referred to the third, or new left wave of terrorism.
But how did he measure this?
How can he be sure that the ending of this terrorist group, or even this wave,
was the result of counter-terrorism measures.
And can we consider that a defeat, a defeat of terrorism.
One study that systematically analyzed how terrorism ends,
is the study by Seth Jones and Martin Libicki, of the RAND Corporation.
They investigated 648 terrorists groups
that were active in the period, 1968, 2006.
And they looked at the way they ended.
And in their report, published in 2008,
they distinguished four major reasons for the ending of these groups.
There are reasons why they ceased to exist.
And the first reason is because of local police and intelligence services.
And the second reason is because of military force.
A third reason is that, terrorists joined the political process.
They join, for instance, negotiations or
something else, we'll come back to that later.
And then the fourth reason is because terrorist groups were victorious.
They managed to achieve their stated political goals.
And Jones and Libicki also touched upon a fifth minor reason,
and that is the splintering of terrorist organizations.
It means that the certain groups end, but
it doesn't signal the end of terrorism by its members.
And it's therefore, excluded from further analysis.
Well let us have a closer look at these four major explanations.
Do they provide reasons to challenge the assumption that terrorism cannot
be defeated?
Have the groups investigated by Jones and
Libicki ended because of successful counter-terrorism measures.
In other words, have they been defeated or not?
The first major reason why terrorist groups end, according to the RAND report,
is because of the work of local police and intelligence services.
Their counter-terrorism majors to include disruption, the collection of information
on terrorist groups, penetrating cells, and arresting key leaders.
And developing anti-terrorism legislation and criminalization of certain activities
is also part of this major explanation for the end of terrorist groups.
Decapitation of terrorist organizations, which we mentioned in the previous video,
and a formal arrest of leaders is also part of it.
Well, the RAND report concludes,
that a wide variety of measures that can be labelled policing contributes,
indeed contributes, to the end of terrorist organizations.
In fact, it says that 40% of the cases in which terrorism
groups end were because of policing.
What about the second major reason why terrorism ends, the use of military force?
Well, this particular counter terrorism measure or
approach, of course, involves the use of military forces to kill or
capture terrorist members, or to fight against states that support terrorism.
Well according to the RAND report, sometimes the threat of the use of force,
or constant surveillance can already be enough to make sure that
terrorist organizations are always on the run.
However, this age old way of fighting terrorism is not particularly effective.
According to the report, only 7% of the terrorist groups that have ended since
1968, did so because of military force, only 7% of the cases.
Well, this limited success is related to the fact that terrorist are,
of course, not armies, and they are very small.
And they don't employ like conventional forces, unless they fight an insurgency.
The report also shows that the use of massive military power could
alienate a local population, and therefore be counterproductive.
The third major reason why terrorism ends is,
because terrorist organizations join a political process.
Well, the possibility for
them to enter such a process depends on the goals of these organizations.
And according to RAND, the narrower the goals,
the more difficult it is for terrorists to achieve them, and
the more likely terrorist groups may be willing to seek nonviolent means.
While the decision to join a political process
is the result of a cost benefit analysis.
And the conclusion of that analysis, that pursuing the goals for politics
has greater benefits and lower cost than using violent means.
So, it's a smarter way, a more cost efficient way to achieve goals.
Does that mean they are defeated?
We're interested in that question,
as our assumption is, terrorists cannot be defeated.
Is this an example of a defeat or not?
Well, I'm not sure about it.
Defeat implies that there's a winner and a loser.
A move into politics,
as such, cannot be called a defeat, not a defeat for a terrorist organization.
But it could be argued that it is a defeat for terrorism, as an instrument.
Because they realize that they can reach their goals,
in a better way, by using nonviolent means.
So, maybe you could call it a defeat of the tool of terrorism.
On the other hand, there are also cases in which terrorist organizations were invited
to join a political process, actually because of the use of violence.
And in these cases one could argue that the use of violence was rewarded, and
therefore, successful.
The fourth, and last major reason for the ending of terrorist groups,
is that they are victorious.
Well, according to RAND, in 10% of the cases,
terrorist organizations were successful, in reaching their stated political goals,
and cease their activities afterwards.
Well obviously,
this type of ending does not challenge the idea that terrorism can not be defeated.
On the contrary, it strengthens the idea that terrorism can be successful.
However, the figures are relatively low, 10%, I would say it's 10% too many.
But, it also shows that the overwhelming majority of terrorist groups do not
achieve their political goals, they are not successful.
So according to the RAND report,
there are four major reasons why terrorist organizations end.
Policing, military force, politics and victory.
Well of all the terrorist groups that ended, 40% did so
because of policing and 7% because of military force.
Well, I think that these two figures clearly support the argument that
terrorism can be defeated.
Together they explained almost half of the case which terrorists group end it.
And the process of joining politics proves that terrorist organizations
can move to nonviolent means to pursue their goals.
And this could partly be the effect of certain counter-terrorism measures, but
you cannot call it a defeat, not in all cases.
This depends, but there are a number of cases where governments, more or
less, force these organizations to join a political process.
And there are examples where these terrorists actually forced the government
to allow them to have a seat at the negotiation table.
If we look at these data, the assumption that terrorism,
meaning terrorist organizations, cannot be defeated, is clearly false.
And I think you can even label it a myth.
Fortunately, these actors can be defeated by counter-terrorism measures,
ranging from policing and use of military force, to forcing them or
talking them into joining a political process.
However, if you look at the phenomenon of terrorism as a whole,
we must conclude that it cannot be defeated.
For instance, David Rapoport shows that there are successive waves of terrorism,
and that it takes a long time for each wave to fade out.
And he also shows that even then, they do not die out completely.
Even today, you still have a few anarchists around.
But we can speed up these processes by defeating individual groups and
networks, and I believe it's important to stress this.
Especially against a background of much pessimism and
defeatism about the possibilities to force large organizations, like Al-Qaeda or
the FARC in Colombia, to end their activities, one way or another.
It will not be easy, but it's not impossible.
Especially that the case of the FARC and Colombia, seems to indicate
that one can end a decade's long struggle by a mix of measures,
including negotiations and a political deal.
What does that mean for the assumption that terrorism cannot be defeated, as for
instance the study of RAND has shown?
It depends on your interpretation of the word, defeated.
If you define it, as a way to convince the other side to stop the fighting,
we can label it a myth or partly true.
It's a myth when looking at many cases in which terrorist organizations were in fact
forced to stop their violent activities.
It can be labelled partly true if one looks at the phenomenon as a whole.
Unfortunately the idea of a world without terrorism, is quite a utopian one.
But again, individual terrorist organizations can be defeated.
To summarize,
we looked at statements that support the idea that terrorism cannot be defeated.
But both the article by Rapoport, and the RAND report show that, at
one point in time, terrorist groups cease to exist and that they can be defeated.
The phenomenon of terrorism as a whole, however, cannot be defeated.
So depending on your interpretation of the assumption,
you can either label it a myth or partly true.
In the next video, we will investigate the assumption that terrorism
can best be dealt with by a way of a holistic or comprehensive approach.
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