Functionalism and What Mental States Do

Loading...

From the course by The University of Edinburgh

Introduction to Philosophy

2936 оценки

The University of Edinburgh

Introduction to Philosophy

2936 оценки

This course will introduce you to some of the main areas of research in contemporary philosophy. Each module a different philosopher will talk you through some of the most important questions and issues in their area of expertise. We’ll begin by trying to understand what philosophy is – what are its characteristic aims and methods, and how does it differ from other subjects? Then we’ll spend the rest of the course gaining an introductory overview of several different areas of philosophy. Topics you’ll learn about will include: Epistemology, where we’ll consider what our knowledge of the world and ourselves consists in, and how we come to have it; Philosophy of science, where we’ll investigate foundational conceptual issues in scientific research and practice; Philosophy of Mind, where we’ll ask questions about what it means for something to have a mind, and how minds should be understood and explained; Political Philosophy, where we'll investigate whether we have an obligation to obey the law; Moral Philosophy, where we’ll attempt to understand the nature of our moral judgements and reactions – whether they aim at some objective moral truth, or are mere personal or cultural preferences, and; Metaphysics, where we’ll think through some fundamental conceptual questions about free will and the nature of reality. The development of this MOOC has been led by the University of Edinburgh's Eidyn research centre. To accompany 'Introduction to Philosophy', we are pleased to announce a tie-in book from Routledge entitled 'Philosophy for Everyone'. This course companion to the 'Introduction to Philosophy' course was written by the Edinburgh Philosophy team expressly with the needs of MOOC students in mind. 'Philosophy for Everyone' contains clear and user-friendly chapters, chapter summaries, glossary, study questions, suggestions for further reading and guides to online resources. Please click "Start Here" and navigate to the "Optional Reading" page for more information.

From the lesson

Minds, Brains and Computers

(Dr. Suilin Lavelle) If you’re reading this, then you’ve got a mind. But what is a mind, and what does it take to have one? Should we understand minds as sets of dispositions to behave in certain ways, as patterns of neural activation, or as akin to programmes that are run on the computational hardware of our brains? In this module, we’ll look at how and why recent philosophy of mind and psychology has embraced each of these options in turn, and think about the problems and prospects for each.

Descartes' Substance Dualism Theory of the Mind11:16

Physicalism: Identity Theory and Functionalism13:23

Functionalism and What Mental States Do8:27

Meet the Instructors

Dr. Dave Ward
Lecturer in Philosophy
University of Edinburgh
Professor Duncan Pritchard
Professor of Philosophy
University of Edinburgh
Professor Michela Massimi
Full Professor
Philosophy
Dr. Suilin Lavelle
Lecturer in Philosophy
University of Edinburgh
Dr. Matthew Chrisman
Reader in Philosophy
Philosophy
Dr. Allan Hazlett
Dr. Alasdair Richmond
Dr.
Philosophy
Guy Fletcher
Lecturer
Philosophy
Elinor Mason
Senior Lecturer
Philosophy

So what Putnam was pointing to was that, instead of thinking about what

psychological states are made of, whether they're made of human brain stuff

or alien brain stuff. We should be thinking about what

psychological states do. Now, in order to get our heads around this

idea, let's take another detour. Imagine travelling to a country

where instead of notes and coins, people trade using shells

they use the shells to pay for services,

the shells rise and fall in value dependent on market forces

and people save shells for a rainy day.

The shells function in just the same way

as bits of metal and paper function as currency in our society

even though they are made of quite different things.

Or imagine that you go someplace where people trade using livestock

swapping cows for other goods or services.

Cows, shells, bits of metal and paper are all very different to look at

and have nothing in common in terms of what they're made of

But they all share a function.

They can be traded for goods and services.

They have value that can fluctuate dependent on market forces.

And one can judge another's wealth

by how many tokens of cows, shells, or bits of metal and paper one has.

Let's take a different example. Imagine lots of different chairs.

What makes all of these pictures that we see, chairs?

Well, is that they function as chairs, we can all use them for sitting down on and

sitting down in such a way that we're raised up from the floor.

What allows us to say that all these things here are chairs, is that they

function in a particular way, they function so as to allow sitting.

Now, this has ties back to the problem that Putnam was pointing out with identity

theory. He's saying we shouldn't identify mental

states of what they're made of, just as we shouldn't identify a chair with what it's

made of. Because as you can see, chairs can be made

of totally different things. Money can be made of totally different

things. What allows us to say that all these

things are chairs and all these things count as money, is what they do.

And that's exactly what Putnam thought we should do with psychological states.

So instead of saying, what makes a particular psychological state what it is?

What makes my thought about Paris, about Paris is what it's made of, the particular

mixture of chemicals and hormones. Putnam says, that instead, we should think

about what that psychological state does, how that psychological state functions?

And in this way, if we think about how pain functions, so we can think about pain

as a particular state that functions to makes us wince when we touch something.

Maybe to say aw or to pull a face. If we think about how pain functions, then

we can then see how pain can be realized in different species.

How we can see pain in humans and pain in octopi, even though pain in humans and

pain in octopi is made up of very different stuff.

It's made up of octopus brain stuff in one instance and human brain stuff in the

other. What it's made of doesn't matter.

What is crucial is how it functions. This is the materialist view know as

functionalism, it says that we should tell mental states apart.

We should think about mental states, not by what they are made of, but by what they

do. So what is it that mental states do?

Well, the first thing that mental states do is they cause particular behaviors.

So, as, the example I like to use is that, if I want some chocolate, then that

particular psychological state causes me to engage in particular behaviors to

finally coat and go out to go to the shops.

But they do other things as well, they can cause new psychological states.

So if I want chocolate, this could also cause a desire for me to find my coat and

I think mm, I really want some chocolate. Okay.

Till you get some more chocolate, then I should go find my coat.

Alright. Let's go find my coat.

So that I have taken a psychological state in my desire for chocolate which causes a

new psychological state in me. The other important thing to understand

about psychological states or mental states is that they're caused by

particular things as well. So my desire for chocolate might be caused

by the smell of chocolate. I could be walking down the street, for

instance, and smell the chocolate coming out of the patisserie and think mm,

chocolate, I really want some. So, that particular perception of the

world caused me to go into a particular state, that oh, I really want some

chocolate. Which then cause me to go into particular

behaviors, i.e., maybe walking in to the shop or thinking, do I have enough money

for some chocolate? Oh, I'm not sure.

Oh, I'm going to eat later. I probably shouldn't have some chocolate.

So, psychological states cause a function in this particular way.

They're caused by sensory inputs and in turn they cause behaviors, and

psychological states, other internal states as their outputs.

The other thing that can cause a psychological state is another

psychological state. So, I might have the belief that I'm

hungry, that's a particular mental state that I have, and that causes me to desire

chocolate. So you can have psychological states that

cause other psychological states. Now, this is the idea of functionalism.

This is the idea that in order to understand what the desire for chocolate

is, we have to understand it in terms of its functional role.

So the desire for chocolate might cause me to put on my coat, go out to the shops.

In contrast, my belief that there's chocolate in the fridge will cause a whole

different set of behaviors in psychological states.

Might cause me to get up and go to the fridge, it might cause me to answer, yes,

if someone says to me, hey, is there any chocolate in the fridge?

And this is the point that Putnam is trying to drive at.

He's saying that we should understand psychological states not by what they're

made of, but how they function. The types of behaviors and psychological

states that they cause and the types of sensory inputs, and perceptions, and

psychological states, which cause them. So, this is how I can see that my desire

for chocolate is different from my belief that there is chocolate in the fridge.

Because it's caused by different things, my desire for chocolate is caused by the

smell of chocolate and the belief that I'm hungry.

And it causes different behavior, such as going to the shops, and trying to find my

coat, and that's very different form the belief that there's chocolate in the

fridge. Because the belief that there's chocolate

in the fridge is caused itself by a whole different set of sensory inputs.

It's caused perhaps by my perception that there's chocolate in the fridge or someone

telling me, hey, there is chocolate in the fridge.

And that mental state function serves to cause very different behaviors causing me

to go to the fridge if I want some chocolate.

Now, you can see how we've completely stepped away from what psychological

states are made of. We've totally stepped away from this mix

of chemicals, mix of hormones, or octopus brain, or alien stuff.

We've abstracted away and saying no. What we should be looking at, what the

fundamental feature of a psychological state is, is what it does.

And what allows us to attribute a state like pain to an octopus, is if that

octopus functions in such a way that we can say it's in the state of having pain.

So if the octopus touched something that was burning, and shrank away very quickly,

we could say, oh, now octopus is in a particular state that causes it to shrink

away when it touches something hot. Well, maybe that octopus is in a state of

pain because that, that state of pain functions in humans, certainly, to have

withdrawal behavior when you touch something hot.

Stating to use the same types of behaviors in an octopus, then that would suggest

that the octopus can also have pain because it's in a state that's functioning

in exactly the same way as human pain. So again we've stepped away from what it's

made of and we're looking at what states do.

Ознакомьтесь с нашим каталогом

Присоединяйтесь бесплатно и получайте персонализированные рекомендации, обновления и предложения.

Coursera делает лучшее в мире образование доступным каждому, предлагая онлайн-курсы от ведущих университетов и организаций.

© Coursera Inc., 2018 Все права защищены.

Загрузить из App Store

Загрузить в Google Play