Protests began in mid 1977. And, from early 1978, a cycle of rioting developed in which religious leaders and motifs became increasingly apparent. It was an effective alliance between the urban poor and the men of religion led by Khamenei in exile, in their shared disaffection with the economic and political situation. In this organized opposition, it was a key role of the network of mosques and religious association in the organization of this revolution in the making. The Shah could repress political organizations, but one could not close down the network of mosques. And, it was through these that the recorded speeches of Khomeini were efficiently distributed to the masses, with the regime's inability to prevent it. Khomeini's appeal to the urban masses was magnetic. And, he was adamant in his demand for the overthrow of the Palmares, and the establishment of an Islamic Republic. The regime was indecisive, mixing between conciliation and repression. The usually coersive regime was restrained in it's use of force. The President of the United States, Jimmy Carter was pressuring the Uranian regime to be more diligent in it's pursuit of human rights. And therefore, reduced the capacity of the regime to use coercive force against the opposition. And, the regime was in need of U.S. support to preserve its deterrent image of outside protection, but this was not forthcoming. By the end of 1978, government began to break down. And, Khomeini returned from his exile in Paris on the 1st of February, 1979. The regime of the Palmares fell ten days later. This was the first instance of a revolution by the masses in the Middle East. And it can be explained by the coalescence of four main destabilizing factors. First, the massive disaffection and dislocation, because of rapid population growth, urbanization, and growing social divisions between the haves, and the have nots. The lower classes did not enjoy the oil wealth of Iran. Tehran had a population of one million in 1945, and five million in 1977. Iran's population was approximately 14 million in 1945, 40 million in 1980, and presently is around 75 million. The second factor, about which we'll elaborate further, is the revolutionizing of the men of religion by Khomeini. The third factor, the failure of the regime to maximize its coercive potential. And, the fourth, the absence of the traditional external force in Iranian politics to act as a deterrent against the opposition. Now, we can address the question of Shi'ism, Ayatollah Khomeini and the revolution. The revolution was characterized by a typically Shi'ite form of mobilization. Invoking the Shi'ite historical narrative of suffering and oppression at the hands of their Sunni oppressors since the seventh century. The struggle over the caliphate, as we have already seen, in support of Ali, the prophet's son in law, and his descendents. His sons, Hussein and Hasan, who were killed just like Ali before them, by their Sunni opponents in the early years of Islam in the seventh century. These were the memories that were mobilized to garner opposition to the rule of the Shah. This narrative of the historically downtrodden underclass was now exploited to great effect against the Shah. The Islamic Republic was established in accordance with the traditional principle of Wilayat al-Faqih, the guardianship of the jurisprudent. And thus, it is worthy of note, that in comparison to the Sunni Islamists, a much greater emphasis was laid in the Shi'ite example on the personality of the ruler. Whereas, the Sunnis tended to place all their emphasis on the implementation of religious law, the Sharia. But, this government by the jurisprudent was given new meaning by Khomeini. Not just the general traditional responsibility for the needy in the community, such as minors, widows, and orphans, this was government by the jurisprudent. The men of religion in the Shi'ite tradition were always deeply involved in politics. But, the majority view was that their role was to advise the ruler, but not to rule themselves. This was the new revolutionary interpretation introduced by Khomeini. The new constitution defined Shiite Islam as the state religion. It also determined the formation of a council of religious experts. Whose task was to ensure that all legislation passed by the Iranian Parliament was in accordance with religious law. In 1982, drastic changes were introduced into the legal system, all laws not in conformity with Islam were revoked. Iran of the revolution has been in existence for well over 30 years. When Khomeini died in 1989, the transition to his successor Ayatollah Khamenei was smooth and uneventful. Iran withstood the onslaught of Iraq in eight years of war. It has developed Iran's nuclear program. It has established impressive regional influence in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon through Hezbollah. The weakness of the Arabs has allowed for the shift of the center of gravity in Middle Eastern politics to the Gulf, and to Iran. There are issues at home facing domestic criticism. The population has doubled since the revolution, and the economy has not been able to keep up with population growth. There are rumblings of dissent on corruption, oppression, and on national priorities. Should more be invested in domestic construction, rather than on Iran's foreign hegemonic design? But perhaps, most importantly, the regime of the Ayatollahs enjoys an aura of legitimacy and authenticity that the Palmare monarchy, always tainted as an instrument of foreign influence, never had.
