If this was the series of events on the Israeli Palestinian Jordanian front, in the aftermath of the June war of 1967, a war of attrition was fought between Israel and the Egyptians across the Suez Canal for two years from 1968 until 1970 as artillery barrages raged across the Suez Canal with the Egyptians and the Israelis trading blows on a very regular basis. But in this war of attrition and the artillery barrages, the Israelis were at a disadvantage. The Egyptians had far more artillery pieces than the Israelis did. And the result was very soon the use by the Israelis of their airforce to compensate for their disadvantage on the ground. This led to deep Israeli attacks inside Egyptian territory by the Air Force in the Nile Valley. And targets all along the very interior of Egypt. The deep penetration raids by Israel led eventually to direct Soviet intervention in the defense of Egypt. And even two dog fights between Israeli pilots and Russian pilots over the skies of Egypt. But the war of Aattrition had a very interesting and deep impact on Egypt and the Egyptian people. This was the first time ever that the war with Israel was really felt by the Egyptian people on their home front. This was not a war fought in the distant deserts of the Sinai Peninsula or the Negev in Israel in 1948. It brought the ravages of war to the recognition of the Egyptian people in a very direct fashion. And in Egypt there was the beginning of the criticism of how much longer should Egypt play the role of the blood bank of the Arabs. Why should Egypt be continuing to pay this heavy price for the struggle of the Arabs against the Israel? And with the initiation off the American Rodgers Initiative, in the summer of 1970, the Egyptians and the Israelis were willing to engage in negotiations after the cease fire that they had achieved in the war of attrition. And to negotiate a peaceful settlement on the basis of Resolution 242. But this willingness of the parties to negotiate did not bring about any agreement at the time. The Egyptians suggested a partial settlement between Israel and Egypt in 1971. A partial settlement whereby Israel would withdraw from the Suez Canal and from parts of the Sinai peninsula as part of a project that would eventually lead to peace between Israel and Egypt based on Israel's full and total withdrawal from all of the Sinai Peninsula back to the 67 boundaries. But this Egyptian initiative was not well-received in Israel. There was indeed Syria's discussion within the Israeli government on the pros and cons of the Egyptian initiative. But the Israelis were very reluctant to commit themselves to complete withdrawal. And weren't quite sure what the kind of peace it was that Anwar Sadat, the new president Egypt after the passing of Abdel Nasser, was offering. Sadat spoke of nineteen seventy-one as his year of decision. That is if he could not achieve a settlement with Israel by peace, Egypt would look towards the option of war. But after 1971 passed uneventfully, the Israels in their rather arrogant and euphoric mood of the post 67 victory did not take the Egyptian threat of war very seriously. In July 1972, Egypt expelled all the Soviet advisors from Egypt. This was actually an effort by the Egyptians to pave the way for war with Israel. Sadat that believed that the Soviet presence in Egypt may constrain Egypt's freedom of decision. But the Israelis and the Americans too understood the expulsion of the Soviet advisors from Egypt in quite the opposite fashion. The Israelis believed that if the Soviet advisors were removed, and many of them were advisors for Egypt's air defense, that the chances of Egypt going to war had not increased but had actually decreased. And in early 1973, Egypt made movements towards an opening of relations with the United States, diplomatic contacts with US. And the belief therefore, was reenforced that Egypt's direction was not towards war. But Egypt was in this insufferable position of indecision of no war and no peace and there was mounting pressure in Egypt to take some action to change the status quo. During 1973, there was joint Egyptian Syrian planning for war against Israel. Egypt and Syria had come to the conclusion they could cooperate in going to war with Israel even though they had very divergent political objectives. Egypt wanted to initiate war with Israel in order to shake up the regional situation to allow for the unfreezing of the diplomatic front, and to have the war re-open a diplomatic initiative for negotiations with Israel. The Syrians had a very different approach. They sought to retrieve their territory from Israel by war, and if successful, maybe even to enter Israeli territory, but it was not about diplomacy that they were thinking. In the planning of Egypt and Syria for going to war against Israel in 1973, the Jordanians were not involved. The Jordanians were not trusted by the Egyptians and the Syrians. It was fear that if they knew about the war plans, they may leak them to the Americans or even to the Israelis. And the Jordanians, when the war came in 1973, decided to stay out and did not participate except indirectly by helping the Syrians face the Israelis on the Syrian front. And thus we arrive to the description of the October war of 1973, that war between Israel, Egypt and Syria, would radically change the situation, that had been created between Israel and the Arabs after 1967.
