Neste curso, você conhecerá os princípios fundamentais da macroeconomia geralmente ensinados em cursos trimestrais ou semestrais para alunos de graduação ou MBA. E, talvez mais importante ainda, você também aprenderá a aplicar esses princípios a uma grande variedade de situações, tanto de sua vida particular quanto profissional. Assim, o Poder da Macroeconomia vai ajudá-lo a ser bem-sucedido em um ambiente globalizado e cada vez mais competitivo. This is a translated version. To join the original English version, please visit this page https://www.coursera.org/learn/principles-of-macroeconomics
Da economia pelo lado da oferta e dos neoclássicos de volta para o keynesianismo
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Из курса от партнера University of California, Irvine
O Poder da Macroeconomia: princípios da economia no mundo real (em Português)
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University of California, Irvine
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Visão geral sobre a Macroeconomia Moderna
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Dr. Peter NavarroProfessor
Paul Merage School of Business
[MUSIC]
In the 1980 presidential election, Ronald Reagan ran on a supply side platform
that promised to simultaneously cut taxes, increase government tax revenues,
and accelerate the rate of economic growth without inducing inflation.
A very sweet macroeconomic cure indeed.
On the surface, the supply side approach looks very similar to the kind
of Keynesian tax cut prescribed in the 1960s to stimulate a sluggish economy.
However, the supply siders viewed such tax cuts
from a very different behavioral perspective.
Unlike the Keynesians,
they did not agree that such a tax cut would necessarily cause inflation.
Instead, the supply siders believe that the American people
would actually work much harder and
invest much more if they were allowed to keep more of the fruits of their labor.
The end result would be to increase the amount of goods and services our economy
could actually produce by pushing out the economy's supply curve.
Hence, supply side economics.
Most important, the supply siders promised that by cutting taxes, and
thereby spurring rapid growth, the loss in tax revenues from the tax cut would
be more than offset by the increase in tax revenues from increased economic growth.
Thus, under supply side economics, the budget deficit would actually be reduced.
Unfortunately, that didn't happen.
While the economy boomed, so too did America's budget deficit.
And as the budget deficit soared, America's trade deficit soared with it.
These so-called twin deficits deeply concerned Reagan's successor George Bush,
particularly after the budget deficit jumped over $200 billion at
the midpoint of his term in 1990 and the economy began to slide into recession.
To any red blooded Keynesian, this onset of recession
would have been a clearer signal to engage in expansionary policy.
However, in the Bush White House,
Ronald Reagan's supply side advisers had been supplanted not by Keynesian but
rather by a new breed of macroeconomic thinkers, the so-called, New Classicals.
New classical economics is based on the controversial theory of
rational expectations.
This theory says that if you form your expectations rationally,
you will take into account all available information,
including the future effects of activist fiscal and monetary policies.
The idea behind rational expectations
is that such activists policies might be able to fool people for a while.
However, after a while, people will learn from their experiences, and
then you can't fool them at all.
Central policy implication of this idea is, of course, profound.
Rational expectations render activist fiscal and
monetary policies completely ineffective.
So they should be abandoned.
We'll talk more about whether this theory is good economics or
not in a later lesson.
But it was clearly bad politics, at least for president Bush.
Indeed, Bush's new classical advisers flatly rejected any
Keynesian quick fix to the deepening recession.
Instead, they call for more stable and systematic policies based on long term
goals rather than a continued reliance on short-sighted, discretionary reactions.
Bush took this new classical advice, the economy limped into the 1992
presidential election, and like Richard Nixon in 1960,
Bush lost to a Democrat promising to get the economy moving again.
What is perhaps most interesting about this transition of power
is that Bill Clinton actually did very little to stimulate the economy.
The mere fact, however, that Clinton promised a more activist approach
helped restore business and consumer confidence.
At the same time, congressional passage of Clinton's deficit reduction
legislation in 1993 sent Wall Street a clear signal that his
administration was serious about budget balance.
Together, these factors helped accelerate a recovery
that had already begun by the end of Bush's term.
These factors also set the stage for Clinton's remarkably easy re-election
in 1996, as well as the longest economic recovery in peacetime history.
The next decade would not, however, be anywhere near as kind or
prosperous as the 1990s.
Shortly after George Walker Bush took office in 2001,
the US economy would fall into recession while by year's end America
would be hit by a 9/11 terrorist attack that would catapult
the country into two expensive wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
In that same year of 2001, China joined the World Trade Organization and
began flooding America with illegally subsidized exports.
Over the next ten years, the US would shut down over 50,000 factories,
lose more than five million manufacturing jobs, and see its historical annual rate
of GDP growth cut by a full two-thirds.
On top of two wars and a burgeoning trade deficit, the US economy would also
be hit in 2007 with a massive collapse of a housing bubble and
soon find itself in the worst recession since the Great Depression of the 1930s.
To pull the nation out of recession and slow growth, the White House and
Congress would orchestrate the biggest fiscal stimulus in history.
While the Federal Reserve would use new monetary policy tools like
quantitative easing to likewise break the record for a huge monetary stimulus.
All these fiscal and monetary stimuli would be to little avail, however.
And in the 2010s, macroeconomists would once again find themselves in
a rapidly changing global economy where traditional fiscal and
monetary policy solutions were no longer working very well, and
where countries around the globe faced deeper seated structural issues,
seemingly resistant to Keynesian solutions.
Of course, the major purpose of this introductory course in macroeconomics
is to help all of us better understand the incredibly complex global
economic forces now affecting both our personal and professional lives.
In the meantime, please remember that economics is not something to be
memorized, but rather something to conceptualize.
So as you study it, think about it, too.
Your job and your business might just depend on it.
[MUSIC]
I am Peter Navarro for the University of Of California-Irvine.
[MUSIC]
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