Two misconceptions (note: this is an extension following the part of the lecture entitled: 'Two kinds of intellectual virtue')

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Из курса от партнера The University of Edinburgh

Intellectual Humility: Theory

193 оценки

The University of Edinburgh

Intellectual Humility: Theory

193 оценки

Faced with difficult questions people often tend to dismiss and marginalize dissent. Political and moral disagreements can be incredibly polarizing, and sometimes even dangerous. And whether it’s Christian fundamentalism, Islamic extremism, or militant atheism, religious dialogue remains tinted by arrogance, dogma, and ignorance. The world needs more people who are sensitive to reasons both for and against their beliefs, and are willing to consider the possibility that their political, religious and moral beliefs might be mistaken. The world needs more intellectual humility. But what is intellectual humility, anyway? And why do people seem so drawn toward intellectual arrogance? Psychologists, philosophers, theologians, and educationalists are now suggesting some answers. In this course we try to define intellectual humility and intellectual virtues in general, and ask how we know who is humble. All lectures are delivered by leading specialists, and the course is organised around a number of interesting readings and practical assignments which will help you address issues related to humility in your daily life. This course is a part of a series which explores the theory, the science and the applied issues surrounding intellectual humility (the latter two coming in June and November 2017). Completing all three courses will give you a broader understanding of this fascinating topic. Look for: • Intellectual Humility: Science - https://www.coursera.org/learn/intellectual-humility-science • Intellectual Humility: Practice - https://www.coursera.org/learn/intellectual-humility-practice You can also follow us on twitter: @EdiPhilOnline and #IHMOOC

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What is an intellectual virtue?

by Professor John Greco

Two misconceptions (note: this is an extension following the part of the lecture entitled: 'Two kinds of intellectual virtue')8:01

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Professor Duncan Pritchard
Professor of Philosophy
University of Edinburgh
Dr. Ian Church
Researcher
Epistemology; Philosophy of Psychology; Philosophy of Religion
Dr. Emma Gordon
Postdoctoral Researcher
University of Edinburgh

[MUSIC]

I want to end this section by talking about two ways

to characterize virtue epistemology, which I think are misleading.

So again, it goes back to, let's say some of us are more interested

in the character versus, intellectual virtues conceived as character virtues:

intellectual courage, open mindedness, fairness.

Others are interested in the faculty virtues, conceived as acute perception,

or sound reasoning, or something like that.

So, one way in which these two camps are sometimes described is

responsibilist versus reliabilist.

And the idea is that people who are concerned with character virtues,

they're really concerned with questions about intellectual responsibility or

epistemic responsibility, and so we should think of them as virtue responsibilists.

Whereas the people who are concerned with faculty virtues or powers,

they're really concerned with questions about reliability,

where reliability has something to do with, we'll talk about this more later,

but reliability has to do with how well you're getting at the truth,

and so that's a natural way to understand our cognitive faculties, is in terms

of how they are getting at the truth and how well they're doing that.

I think this is a misleading way to divide up the field and what people are doing.

The reason it's misleading, I think, is because if you're

interested in epistemic responsibility and character virtues,

it's not as if questions about reliability are now irrelevant.

One reason we're interested in the character virtues is not just

because we're interested in what makes us responsible believers, but

it's also what makes us reliable believers.

Presumably, someone who is intellectually arrogant, for example, is going to be less reliable

to someone who is more appropriately epistemically humble.

So, it's not as if the reliable question and the responsibility, the reliability

questions and the responsibility questions, can be divorced from each other.

Same thing happens in the other camp.

It's true that when we're thinking about knowledge, we want to know,

well, are we reliably getting at truth in a certain domain.

But again, you can't just separate reliability from responsibility,

because one of the main ways we're going to be reliable is that we act responsibly.

So, irresponsible behavior in the intellectual domain is going to undermine

reliability in the intellectual domain.

So, it's not as if, you know, you can just, that's a good way to divide the field.

The second way that people characterize the field,

which again I think is somewhat misleading,

is to make a distinction between internalist virtue epistemology

and externalist virtue epistemology.

That's kind of a technical notion,

but I think it's important to have some kind of feel for it just because you might

encounter this terminology if you do more reading in virtue epistemology.

So, if you're talking about what makes a belief justified

or what makes a belief rational, or what makes a belief epistemically responsible

for example, an internalist is going to try to answer those questions

only by referring to what is going on inside the head, so to speak,

what the believer can sort of understand about herself.

So, if I'm justified, I should be able to tell whether I'm justified or whether

I have the goods for being justified just by considering things like what evidence

I have, or what my experiences are like, or something like that.

An externalist is going to say a certain epistemic standing or

epistemic value in question really requires more than that.

It's not just about what's going on inside the head

or what's going on that I can just reflect on.

It might have to do with how I'm hooked up to the world,

what relationship I have with other people, what kind of causal

mechanisms are involved in, say, my interaction with the world.

These are all things that are sort of facts outside my head, facts which I

can't know just by reflecting on what's going on in the inside,

but they're facts about what's going on on the outside.

So, hence, externalists think that those sort of facts are important.

Internalists think that only the internal facts are the important facts

for figuring out these epistemological issues.

So, some people talk about internalist virtue of epistemology and they say,

look the people who are concerned with character virtues,

they're really internalists.

The character virtue epistemologists are just about what's going on in the inside.

Whereas, the people who are talking about faculty epistemology

and how our faculties are getting at the world, they're externalists.

Well, I guess that's right as far as it goes,

but I think it's a misleading way of characterizing things.

Because if you ask questions about intellectual character, again,

character has to do with habit, which has to do with past performance,

it has to do with causal dispositions of how you respond to the world, etc.

These are all externalist features, and so the character virtue epistemologists

can't be concerned only with what's going on inside the head, so to speak.

Part of a person's character speaks to how they're interacting with the world,

and so brings in external factors.

Similarly, on the faculty side, certainly external factors about

our mind-world relation, for example, are important when we're talking about,

are our faculties functioning properly, or are they functioning reliably, etc.

But internal factors, what's going on inside the head,

are not going to be just irrelevant.

So, you can't really talk interestingly about perception, or about memory,

or about what excellent perception involves, what excellent memory involves,

what excellent reasoning for that matter involves,

by just ignoring what is accessible to the knower or the believer.

So, just as character virtue epistemologists are going to be concerned

with both internalist and externalist considerations,

so are faculty epistemologists going to be concerned with both internalist

and externalist considerations.

So again, I think it's just misleading to divide the field that way as if, you know,

character is all about internalist factors

and faculty is all about externalist faculties.

So, I think the better way to sort of divide up the field

is really just to recognize that there are two kinds of intellectual excellence,

intellectual virtue.

There are character virtues, there are faculty virtues,

and then we can ask: what they are good for?

Which kind of questions?

Which kind of issues are they going to help us with?

And we can use these different theoretical resources as they're available to help us,

where they can help us.

We can also go ask how these two kinds of intellectual virtue

are related to each other. That's the topic of part three.

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