[MUSIC] It's a kind of paradox the concept of international system which seems to be so obvious and so important has not been used in international relation theory. That's particularly strange as the real history gives us a macrovision of international politics. But, realism was a little bit reluctant to the concept of system, which implies an idea of order. For the realist, there is no order in the international arena as it is a permanent fight among gladiators. It's a kind of an anarchy and so we had to wait for the great moment of the system theory for observing the first choices of the concept of international system, that's to say around the 60s or 70s. So very late. My purpose is to define what is an international system, which is not so obvious too. How to define it. And after, I will offer lecture on what is multilateralism. That's to say how multilateralism is shaping the international system. And then [COUGH] we have to take into account the famous problem of polarity. Are we facing a unipolar or a multipolar, or a post-bipolar system. What does it mean? What is an international system? I would say that an international system is a state of international life, a moment, a sequence of the international life. It is made for helping to describe and to understand constraint weighing on actors and relations. It is I would say a set of international practices that can be identified at a given sequence of the time. Now the problem is to define the criteria of the international system. If the international system is a moment of the international life, how to seize this moment? How to describe this moment? Which kind of variable has to be used and mobilized for describing the international order. I will sell it four criteria, four valuables, which are explaining the transformation of the international system. First one is degree of inclusiveness. Is the international system including all of the potential actors? All the potential actors it means first all the states, all the sovereign states. And we have to take into account something very important, and even crucial for understanding the international system, that generally all the state actors don't participate in the international system. If we observe the European 19th century, international system, it was limited to Europe. It pretends to cover all the world, and to take into account what, for instance, took place in Latin America, but however, only European states were participating in. The China or Ottoman Empire were not admitted as members of the international system. And which a Monroe doctrine US didn't accept to participate in this kind of international system. And now the problem is what about developing countries. Formerly, of course, they are members of the international system, but sometimes late members if you take into account for instance the decolonization process. This decolonization process took place during the 60s, mainly during the 60s. And so before 1960 the major part of the world was not actively participating in the international system. Now another question is, what about the non-state actors? That's to say is the inclusiveness of the international system also covering non-state actors, which are more and more active, more and more relevant inside the international arena, but which don't really participate in. The second variable would be, what about the deliberation? A international systeml can be identified through its way of deliberating. That's to say, how deliberation is going on. What are the institutions, the procedures, and what are the members of the international system, which are actively participating in the decision. And so we have to observe that for the major parts of the international systems. Those one where oligarchic or even diarchic. That's to say we have to take into account the difference between active states, which are really participating in the decision making process and passive states. For instance, now with the P5, that to say the five permanent member of the security counsel of the UN, only five sovereign states are really active states in the international arena and the others have to follow. If now we take into account the G group, that's to say, G7, G8, or G20, all the other members are now participating in the decision making process. And so we can say that this deliberation is really oligarchic. And so we can classify international systems according to the real participation of the actors to the decision. Third criterion, it would be the alliances which are composing the international systems. Are this alliances structured or not? Are they covering all the state of the world or not? Or only small plot? Are they lasting like NATO for instance created in 1949 up to now, are precarious. This is another variable. And the last one will be, of course, the type of power and domination which is exercised inside the international system. Is there an hegemonic power? Is there a condominium, or is there a decentralized power inside the international system? If now we try to classify the international system, so we have to take into account not to fall into three traps. The first one would be the obsession with polarization. Considering that all the international systems are polarized. That's not true. Polarization as we will see is an exception. What about the non-polarized international system? The second trap would be the absence of a social dimension. That's to say international system is not only made of state actors, is not only made of sovereign states, but more and more as we saw previously more and more by non-state actors. What are these non-state actors? How to classify them, and how to consider their participation in the international life. And the third tribe will be disregarding the temporal factor. That's to say international system is not a stable one, and the international system is moving, is transforming. And this transformation is probably a decor of the international analysis. If for putting an end to this lecture I consider the different kinds of international system, I would say that, for instance, beginning with the Vienna congress from 1815 up to 1818, we had a kind of oligarchic joined management. That's to say, the four winners of the war against Napoleon, were co-managing the international system. From 1818 up to 1871, that's to say the creation of Germany, I would say that we have an unstable and a conniving coalition, fragile unstable fragile coalition among the major European powers, but without a real common management, a kind of competition. From 1871 up to 1914, that's to say the beginning of the first World War, we have a conniving antagonism, that's to say structuring alliances, which will result in the confrontation of the first World War. From 1918 up to 1939, that's to say the second World War, we had a very fluid International systems without any structure ratio. And without a very fast transformation of the coalitions and alliances. Now from 1945 to 1947 very brief period test after the war, we had a kind of fragile joint management. A kind of condominium between USSR and US who were the two winners of the Second World War. I mean the main two winners of the Second World War. From 1947 up to 67 we had to rigid by polarity. From 67 up to 89 that's to say the destruction of the wall, of the Berlin wall, we had a diarchic polarization. From 1989 up to 944 we had limited unipolarity around US, which was the real winner of the Cold War. And from 1994 up to now we have a kind of fragmented apolarity. Without clear achemany without a clear structure ratio and beck of the system is not very clear. It's kind post bipolar system without deciding exactly on the content of this international system. [MUSIC]
