Today, we're going to look at two cases, Mills v. Wyman and Webb v. McGowin to introduce the concept of moral obligation and the possibility of moral consideration. First, let's look at the case of Mills v. Wyman, which was decided by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in 1825. While traveling abroad, the Wyman's adult son became ill and without Wyman's request or consent, the plaintiff, Mills, cared for Wyman's son. Afterward, Wyman promised to pay MIlls for his expenses but later recanted and refused to pay. Mills sued for enforcement of Wyman's promise. The trial court granted defendant a nonsuit and the instant court affirmed. So the issue is, was the defendant's moral obligation arising from the plaintiff's care for the son sufficient consideration to bind his promise to pay? And the answer is, at least in 1825, no. The court held that it was not. According to the court, a mere moral obligation combined with a promise is not sufficient to enforce the promise, even when refusal to perform such a promise may be disgraceful. The court acknowledged that moral obligation and a promise are sometimes sufficient to qualify as consideration, but only if there was a preexisting legal obligation at some time in the past. For example, if a debt was once owed but now has become unenforceable because the statute of limitations has run out to bring suit, but the debtor then subsequently promises to repay the creditor anyway, the debtor's moral obligation of owing money in the past binds him because it stems from this pre-existing legal obligation combined with the subsequent promise. Absence a pre-existing legal obligation however, the law leaves moral obligations to the conscience of the promisor. In the words of the court, quote "The law of society has left most of such obligations to the inferior forum as the tribunal of conscience has been aptly called". So, remember timing is important. Assume that Wyman learns that Mills is caring for his adult son and promises then to reimburse Milles for his expenses if Mills continues the care for his son. And then Mills continues to care for Wymans son, but Wyman later refuses to pay. And Mills sues Wyman for expenses incurred after the promise was made. Is there consideration? Well of course. In this alternative scenario, Wyman promises to reimburse Mills in exchange for continued care. Wyman's promise comes before Mills continuous care not after as in the actual facts of the case. Mills loses in this case because as a matter of traditional contract law, past consideration is no consideration. Marxists can have a field day with this decision. Past consideration is no consideration when you care for the sick, a law the Good Samaritan. But it's sufficient when a capitalist lender might lose the right to collect on a past debt due. Now, let's see how the Court of Appeals in Alabama handled a similar promise 110 years later, in the 1935 case of Webb v. McGowin. Webb was an employee of McGowin's mill. One day, Webb was badly injured when he saved McGowin's life by diverting the path of a 75 pound pine block that was falling from the upper stories of the mill. After the incident, in return for saving his life, McGowin promised to pay Webb $15 every two weeks or $390 per year for the rest of Webb's life. And these payments were made but after McGowin's death, his executor refused to continue making the payments. Webb sued for the continuation of the payments. And the trial court found for the defendant on the basis of the defendant's demur that there was no consideration, but the instant court reversed and remanded for a new trial. And the issue in this case was, also, is the defendant's moral obligation sufficient consideration to bind him contractually? Well in this case, the court held it was. The court articulates an exception to the past consideration is no consideration rule, and holds a moral obligation is a sufficient consideration to support a subsequent promise to pay, for the promisors received a material benefit, although there was no original duty or liability resting on the promisor. In other words, material benefit plus moral consideration plus subsequent promise equals sufficient consideration. The holding in Mills v. Wyman that moral obligation without a pre-existing legal obligation is not sufficient to support consideration is often considered the traditional rule, while the holding in Webb v McGowin by contrast is often called the modern rule. Can the decision in Webb be reconciled with Mills? Well, perhaps. For one thing the court in Webb v. McGowin states that the promisor must've received a material benefit, that spurred his promise to repay. Mr. McGowin certainly received a material benefit when his life was saved, but did Wyman receive a material benefit when Mills cared for Wyman son?. Well arguably not. His son certainly did but Wyman's benefit was psychic and his son was already of adult age, and maybe that's not sufficiently material. Second, it's worth noting that Wyman himself recanted the promise while McGowin did not. McGowin's promise was made in writing and actually performed until his death. It wasn't until after McGowan's death that his executor repudiated the promise. In other words, the cord in Webb v. McGowin may have simply been trying to divide up into state according to the testator as a parent wishes. As usual, the restatement has something to say about moral obligation, which is fairly consistent with the holding in Webb. Section 86 of the restatement reads, " A promise made in recognition of a benefit previously received by the promisor from the promisee is binding to the extent necessary to prevent injustice." And, "A promise is not binding under the first subsection if the promisee conferred the benefit as a gift or for other reasons the promisor has not been unjustly enriched, or to the extent that its value is disproportionate to the benefit.". Note how the elements of Section 86 parallel those of contracts implied in law that we studied in Baley versus West, especially the conferral of a benefit that wasn't conferred as a gift. In some ways, the modern rule can be seen as allowing recovery when there is moral past consideration. When the beneficiary has gone further and given the court with his or her promise a specific price at which to value the benefit. It's as if moral consideration is quasi-contract plus an explicit promise. So, would the Mills v. Wyman case be decided differently under Section 86 of the restatement? Well, maybe not. First, the defendant can argue that since the benefit was conferred on an emancipated son, there is no need to enforce the promise to prevent injustice. And second, the Good Samaritan conferred the benefit as a gift. There was no intention to charge thus the result is arguably the same today as it was in 1825. Well let's recap. A promise given in return for past good deed creates a moral obligation for the promisor. Today, we considered whether it is sufficient consideration to also create a legal obligation, if there is a subsequent promise. Under the traditional rule articulated, it's not sufficient consideration unless there were some pre-existing legal obligations such as a past due debt that's no longer enforceable. But under the modern rule, it is sufficient consideration, at least when the promisee's past good deed is created a material benefit for the promisor. The restatement is thus consistent with the modern rule.
