So, Richard, China's got a new leader.
Xi Jinping, three years in power.
Has he changed Chinese foreign policy?
>> Yes, great change.
Xi Jinping, you can see,
his foreign policy is greatly different from his predecessors.
So he's very active and
his contact of foreign policy is quite different from his predecessor, Hu Jintao.
He travels in the last three years more than 30 countries and
he has his own style.
He has his own set of rhetoric.
And also, in terms of foreign policy, vision, strategy, he's quite different.
Let me give you some example.
Now, he brings in a new concept called big power diplomacy.
Big power diplomacy is not talking about how to deal with other big powers but
he's emphasized China should self-identify, identify self as big power.
So you have a sense of big power, responsibility, you need to have a big
power mindset and big power manner to contact foreign policy.
>> And that other states should treat you as a big power.
>> Yes that's very much different from the predecessor.
And China want to project itself as a big power,
responsible power produce more public goods for international society.
Second the basis of conducting foreign policy is,
we need to draw a bottom line, this is China's core national interest.
Whoever violates this or step over this red line, China will retaliate.
So China [INAUDIBLE] at becoming more affirmative on China's national interest.
Especially on territorial disputes.
>> So like the nine dotted line.
[CROSSTALK] We draw the line, the Philippines cross it, we've got them.
>> Yeah, on the east China sea, in the south China sea, China is a very,
becoming more assertive to assert it's interest in these areas.
>> JP do you, sorry, do see China being more a change under sea or
some degree of continuity, power of relations.
>> Well there's been some changes, I think we see China more thriving for
achievements rather than- >> Thriving.
>> Thriving for achievements rather than keeping a low profile.
I think what Xi Jinping did was put the last
nail on the coffin of the low profile, Jinping's low profile diplomacy.
But I think there's been a gradual change and if there was, there's been a turning
point, I would rather see two or eight as a turning point.
The year of the Olympics, the year of the financial crisis in the world,
the year where China felt that the US was in decline,
the west was in decline, and China's time has come.
And I think that all the changes which have been mentioned by Richard
can be traced back to 2008.
Core interest- >> But
Xi Jinping wasn't the leader then, right?
>> Yes, that's why.
I think it's much more the result, I mean, Xi Jinping's diplomacy,
much more a result of a collective mindset among the Chinese leadership.
As China is getting stronger, it has now much more meaningful military force.
Has a much, is the second economy of the world since 2010.
I think that you see a lot of those ingredients pushing China in the same
direction.
Now the final question we should ask ourselves is whether another regime be
more pluralistic, democratic, would carry out a different foreign policy,
would it be the same kind of grapevine diplomacy and
grapevine foreign policy as the one now carried out by Xi Jinping.
>> Well, I'll give you a minute later on you can come back with that one.
So Baohui, what do you think, do you think that Xi's changed things a lot or
is this, because 2008, Xi wasn't in power yet.
>> Well I see both continuity and changes, continuity in the sense that
is pursuing the same core objectives as his predecessors,
which as I said earlier, is to make China more powerful.
So every system Chow Ping, every Chinese leader pursues it.
>> Mao wanted to make China more powerful.
>> Exactly, they all have the same core objective.
>> Build a bomb. >> China's rise in the national system.
And it's no different in that sense, but
on the other hand, he is also actually [INAUDIBLE] transform policy.
He has effectively ended lying low [INAUDIBLE] strategy.
China is striking out.
China not only striking out,
China's actively trying to reshape international system.
