This course will highlight the construction and interpretation of the U.S. Constitution through the centuries. You'll learn the history behind the Constitution, cases that formed important precedent, and how changes in interpretation have been dependent on shifts in cultural and political climate as well as the composition of the Supreme Court. We'll start with an overview of the Constitution where we'll consider questions such as "Why the Constitution?" and "What function does the Constitution serve?" Next we'll examine how the Constitution and its subsequent interpretation established the powers of the federal, legislative, and judicial branches of government and allocated powers to the states. Join me as we look at the questions both raised and answered by the Constitution and those that interpret it! By the end of this course, you should be able to: - Describe how the structure of the United States government has been shaped by both the text of the Constitution and by subsequent interpretation and practice of political actors in all branches of government - Illustrate compromises found in the Constitution by citing examples and historic background - Articulate the importance of key cases such as Marbury v. Madison, McCullough v. Maryland, and Lochner v. New York - Explain how the outcome of cases is often dependent upon the current cultural and political climate as well as the composition of the court by citing particular cases and important shifts in the court's jurisprudence - Assess the relative suitability of various approaches to constitutional interpretation and analysis
The Commerce Clause - Part 2
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Из курса от партнера University of California, Irvine
Chemerinsky on Constitutional Law - The Structure of Government
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University of California, Irvine
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Lecture 3 - The Federal Legislative Power
In this module we will consider three major questions: 1.How did McCullough vs. Maryland shape the power of the legislature? 2. What are the major powers of the Congress under the Constitution? 3. To what extent do states limit the power of the Congress?
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Erwin ChemerinskyDean and Distinguished Professor of Law, and Raymond Pryke Professor of First Amendment Law
School of Law
[SOUND] From the 1890s to 1936,
the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional over 200 federal,
state, and local laws that were trying to
protect workers, consumers, the public.
This era of American history is commonly referred to as the Lochner Era.
It takes its name from a 1905 Supreme court decision Lochner versus New York.
That case involved a New York law
that limited the number of hours that bakers could work in a week.
They couldn't work more than 60 hours a week, more than 10 hours a day.
The Supreme Court declared that law unconstitutional,
is violating freedom of contract, which it said was protected under
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Now though that case involved the due process clause and
not Congress's power, the label Lochner Era is used to describe
this entire 40 year period from the 1890s through 1936.
It was during this time that Congress and
state legislatures repeatedly adopting progressive legislation.
These were laws to prohibit the use of child labor, laws to limit the number of
hours that a worker could be employed, laws that required a minimum wage.
If Congress adopted such laws during this time, the Supreme Court struck them down
as exceeding the scope of Congress' power or infringing states' rights.
If a state adopted such laws, they were struck down as violating due process.
I'll cover the due process cases from the Lochner Era
later in a subsequent part of this lecture.
Now what I want to focus on is on how the Court from the 1890s to 1936 so
limited the scope of Congress' Commerce Clause authority.
But it's important to see, both of these transitive decisions.
The case about the commerce clause and
the case about the process is fitting together.
They all came down at the same time.
They all were about a very conservative court that was deeply committed
to a laissez-faire unregulated economy, striking down government regulations.
Now the court did this, with regard to the commerce clause,
by narrowly interpreting what the word commerce means, and
also by narrowly interpreting the phrase among the states.
The court also did this by saying there's a zone of
activities left just to the state governments, something I'll get to in
the third aspect of this part of the lecture about Congress' power.
Here I want to focus on what the court said on limiting Congress' authority
to regulate commerce among the States.
As to the meaning of commerce, the Supreme Court said,
commerce is just one phase of business.
The court said there are many stages of business.
There's mining, there's manufacture, there's production, and
then there's commerce, and that's just the buying and the selling.
In Congress and the commerce clause could only regulate that last stage.
The court said this early in this phase of American history, and
said it late in its phase in 1936.
Give examples.
An early case was US v EC Knight.
Congress passed anti-trust laws to break up monopolies.
Congress believed that such monopolies will strain the trade and
very much undermine the function of the economy.
And there was an attempt to use the newly adopted federal anti-trust law
to break up a monopoly in the sugar beet industry.
But the Supreme Court held that it was unconstitutional for
Congress to use its anti-trust laws, and
to use its commerce power, to break up monopolies in the sugar beet industry.
The Supreme Court said growing sugar beets is about production.
It's not about commerce.
The court said Congress is supposed to have limited powers under
the Constitution.
Therefore, the commerce power has to be interpreted
in order to restrict what Congress can do.
The court said Congress cannot use its commerce power to regulate
things like production, or growing of sugar beets, or refining of sugar beets.
All Congress can do is use its commerce power to regulate the last stage of
business, the buying and selling stage of business.
This of course is quite different from a John Marshall interpretive commerce.
In Gibbons v Ogden, John Marshall would have said commerce
includes all phases of business, but not during this time in American history.
The Supreme Court said, we've gotta reserve governess of the states.
We've gotta limit what Congress can do,
and one way to do this is by narrowly defining the meaning of commerce.
An example, from the latter part of the phase, is a case called,
Carter v Carter Co., in 1936.
It's part of President Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal legislation,
codes of competition were developed for various industries.
This particular case involved the code of competition that was developed for
the coal mining industry.
And it imposed things like minimum wage, maximum hours for coal miners.
The Supreme Court in Carter v Carter Co in 1936 declared this unconstitutional.
The Court said Congress was regulating mining, production.
Congress can't do that.
Congress can only regulate commerce, the buying and selling.
This exceeds the scope of Congress' authority.
It's worth thinking about whether this is sensible and
a desirable way of interpreting the Constitution.
Those who would defend the Court's decision would say
it's essential that Congress' commerce power be limited,
because federal government is meant to have limited powers.
Most governance is to be at the states.
And they would say this is a way of limiting what Congress can do.
But critics would say this is an arbitrary limit,
why would a company want a monopoly in growing sugar beets?
Because it let's them have them monopoly profits when it comes time to sell them.
It's an arbitrary distinction among stages of business.
That makes no sense to draw a distinction between coal mining and
the ultimate selling of coal.
But if coal companies don't have to pay very much to the workers,
then they can sell the coal and make more of a profit.
Again arguing that the distinction among stages of business is non-sensible.
Those who would oppose what the Supreme Court said Congress should have
all of the powers that are necessary to regulate the modern economy.
So one thing the court did during this era was it narrowly define the scope of
Congress' commerce power by restrictively interpreting the word commerce.
Another thing it did was narrowly interpret what among the states mean.
The Supreme Court said in order for Congress to regulate, it
would have to be shown that the activity had a direct effect on other states.
An indirect effect wouldn't be enough.
Case here was Schechter Poultry v US from 1936.
It's commonly referred to in American history as the sick chickens case.
As I mentioned, the National Industrial Recovery Act, a key New Deal law,
created codes of competition for various industries, and
a code of competition was created concerning the poultry industry.
It limited, with reguard to sick chickens,
was trying to make sure that only healthy chickens were sold.
A kosher butcher in New York brought a challenge to this.
Now I think there was a strong argument that this fit within even
a narrow definition of the commerce clause.
That these chickens were actually going to New Jersey, so
isn't that among the states?
But the Supreme Court found this law to be unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court said,
Congress here was regulating chickens within the state of New York.
That's not among the states.
Now the United States government,
defending this law, tried to go back to John Marshall and Gibbons v Ogden.
Tried to say among the states means effecting more than one state.
Sick chickens in one state,
especially if they're going to other states, do have an effect.
But the Supreme Court said Congress can regulate activities
based on an effect in other states only that is, quote, a direct effect.
An indirect effect isn't good enough.
The court defended this by saying that Congress is meant to have limited powers.
Congress doesn't have restricted authority if any effect is enough.
The only way to make sure we preserve the states is that there be a direct effect.
But again, one can question whether this is a desirable distinction.
How is a line to be drawn between what's direct as opposed to indirect?
It's really a matter of degree, it's a matter of characterization.
These cases are typical of what the court was doing
from the 1890s to 1936, narrowly defining the scope
of Congress' commerce power, narrowly defining what commerce means.
Restrictively interpreting what among the states mean, and
in that way adopting what I've call this federalist,
this restrictive perspective on Congress' power.
All of this then changes, and changes dramatically,
in 1937 when the pendulum swings, and swings very far in the other direction.
And the court adopts what I'd call the Nationalist perspective.
As I mentioned earlier, this might have been precipitated
by President Franklin Roosevelt's court packing plan.
As I mentioned after being elected President, by a landslide in 1936,
Roosevelt proposed increasing the size of the Supreme court,
giving the President the power to appoint a new justice for everyone who was
currently over the age of 70 up to a maximum of 15 justices on the court.
Roosevelt was furious about how the Supreme Court, during his first term,
had repeatedly been striking down New Deal legislation
as exceeding in scope of Congress' commerce power.
But what happens is, Congress becomes very concerned over is this
an encroachment of the judicial independence?
Congress holds elaborate hearings and is holding up the idea of court packing, and
while this is going on, one justice, Owen Roberts, changes his mind.
Roberts, who had been with the majority in limiting Congress' power,
in limiting state power with the due process clause,
all of the sudden joins with the dissenters to create a new majority.
A majority that very quickly repudiates all of the decisions of the Lochner Era.
With regard to the commerce clause,
the case was in 1937 NLRB v Jones & Laughlin Steel, and
it concerned the ability of Congress to regulate labor within a steel mill.
The steel mill said we're production.
We're not buying and selling.
To regulate our workers, to regulate our practices,
doesn't fit within the scope of Congress' commerce power.
The Supreme Court,
in NLRB v Jones Laughlin Steel, rules in favor of the federal government,
favor of the ability to regulate what goes on in steel mills.
And the court rejects the early Lochner Era decisions.
The court says that commerce is all stages of business.
Commerce isn't just limited to just buying and selling.
The court said Congress is meant to broad authority under the commerce clause.
The court follows this up, very quickly, with two other quite famous decisions.
One is a case called Wickard v Filburn.
It's one of the most famous cases ever decided by
the Supreme Court with regard to the commerce power.
It involves a federal law that limited the amount of wheat
that a farmer could grow for his or her family's consumption.
Now the family and the farmer challenge the law,
saying what we grow for our home consumption
doesn't fit with in the scope of Congress' power of commerce among the states.
But the Supreme Court ruled against the farmer and upheld the Federal Law.
The Supreme Court said we're passed the time
when the Court was going to enforce limits on Congress's commerce power.
The Court said Congress can regulate so long as it's an activity,
that taken accumulatively, has an effect on interstate commerce.
Let me say that again.
Wickard v Filburn says Congress can regulate so long as it's
an activity, that taken accumulatively, has an effect on interstate commerce.
The Supreme Court says,
home grown wheat has a substantial effect on interstate wheat prices.
Now, no one claimed what this farmer was growing
really itself had an effect on interstate commerce.
Supreme Court says, that doesn't matter!
The Court says, if it look cumulatively, at all of the wheat,
that all of the farmers grow for home consumption, cumulatively
there's a substantial effect on interstate commerce, and that's all that's required.
So no longer does it have to be a direct as opposed to an indirect effect.
That so long as the activity is with type, that taken cumulatively,
has a substantial effect on interstate commerce.
That's good enough.
What, taken cumulatively, doesn't have that kind of an effect?
The final case to come down,
and these are all in the early 1940s, is a case called the United States v Darby.
And this involves whether or
not Congress can require that a minimum wage be paid in a lumber mill.
Now the challenge was brought by the lumber mill owner
that this isn't part of interstate commerce.
This is localized within a state, can't be said that what
these workers are paid really has an effect on interstate commerce.
And the Supreme Court upholds the federal law.
And the court says the time has passed in which we are going to
strike down laws as exceeding the scope of Congress's commerce power.
The court says commerce involves all stages of business.
That includes the making of lumber.
And Congress can regulate anything, that taken accumulatively,
has an effect on those in other states.
Obviously, what workers are paid has,
when you look at accumulative across the country, an effect on interstate commerce.
And so the court upholds the federal law.
These three cases, NLRB v Jones & Laughlin Steel,
Wickard v Filburn, the United States v Darby,
completely repudiate the Lochner Era Commerce Clause decisions,
and they usher in an era, that from 1937 to 1995,
saw not one federal law declared unconstitutional as
exceeding the scope of Congress's commerce power.
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